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1. Introduction 
As a new medium of communication, Internet provides an open and interacted information p latform. 
Netizens can express their opinions about any social emergency through Internet forums, reviews, b logs, 
micro -bloggings, emails and other methods. However, when the public opinions in Internet become an 
electronic, physical or content threat, Internet emergency happens. For example, the public opin ions in Internet 
about the Sun Zhigang Incident  in  2003 made the Chinese government abolish the unconstitutional 
 [1]. Obviously the public opinions in 
Internet have an active effect on the real society and become a powerful force in social change. But, in many 
Internet violence cases, for example, the Bronze Mustache Case, the Cat Abuse Case, and the Very  Erotic, 
Very V  Case, have invaded the parties  privacy and other rights  [2]. However, because of h igh-
technology and virtuality of Internet emergencies, people often neglect  to manage such issues and protect their 
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Abstract 
This paper studies evolutionary mechanism and information supervision of public opinions in Internet emergency. The 
netizen behaviors are characterized by observation, imitation and learning, which well fits the hypothesis of bounded 
topics as the payoff in factor games, and build the evolutionary equation of public opinions, which is the infectious diseases 
diffusion model with changing population size. After that, we apply the theoretical model to the evolutionary course of 
-
information supervision and control measures for social affairs on the evolutionary course of public opinions are discussed 
based on results of numerical simulation. 
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own rights. In fact, the aftereffects are actually same serious as social emergencies in reality, especially  in some 
soft-power fields, such as images, brands, reputations, credits, and so on. At present, most theoretical literatures 
have focused on the information management in the social emergencies in reality. For example, Koehler etc. 
discussed the environmental and healthy risks information gap between the information supply and demand of 
the parties concerned [3]. Liu discussed the information effect on unexpected incidents involving mass 
participation [4]. Cambraia et al. proposed guidelines for identifying, analyzing and disseminating information 
on near misses in construction sites  [5]. Liu et al. proposed an Internet emergency search method based on 
network information traffic [6]. Fanti et al. investigated the desensitizat ion to media vio lence over a short 
period of time [7]. In general, Internet emergency is a controversial topic among the media, scholars, netizens 
and governments, despite that some countries have issued tentative provisions about Internet information 
supervision and control. Recently, a Foreign Policy Magazine article argued that Wikileaks and social media 
played important roles in the events of the Tunisian Jasmine Revolution, where the protests were aided by 
social networking tools like Twitter, LiveJournal, and Facebook [8,9]. Along with high-speed progress of 
information construction in some newly industrializing countries, Internet emergency requires more attention. 
The netizen behaviors are characterized by observation, imitation and learning, which accords with the 
hypothesis of bounded rationality in evolutionary game. In this paper, we propose several new evolutionary 
game concepts about Internet emergency, and use these concepts to explain the public opinion evolutionary 
mechanism and information supervision. 
2. Evolutionary Game Model of Internet Emergency 
2.1. Factor game with individual acceptant degree 
It is not unusual that some social hot topics turn out to be the inducement of Internet emergencies. A netizen 
may comment on a particular social event according to his/her own value judgment, the available informat ion, 
the attitudes of other netizens, etc. Because of the anonymous, costless and off-site indirect d iffusing 
characteristics of Internet information, most of the netizens obtain cognition through secondhand information 
from other netizens. 
In the tradit ional evolutionary game theory, a normal form stage game is defined by the fitness function f(xi, 
xi-1) or (expected) payoff function u(xi, xi-1), where xi S is the (possibly mixed) strategy chosen by a specific 
player i, and xi-1 S  is the current state. Obviously, the concept of fitness derived from population biology is 
not suitable to explain social and economic phenomena. Even if the netizens  payoffs in the Internet virtual 
world  may be represented by some kind of v irtual money in an Internet game or the click-through rates in a 
forum, the goals of most netizens concerned about an Internet emergency are not to obtain virtual money or to 
increase the click-through rate. Usually, most of netizens are not loyal to a particu lar forum. That is to say, they 
post their opinions or they go through the opinions of others when they randomly visit some websites . 
In this paper, we propose a concept of individual acceptance degree  in the case of an Internet emergency 
to replace the existing concept of payoff . Usually, the netizens  attitudes towards a specific social hot topic 
can be divided into Support (S) , Neutral (N) , or Denial (D) . Thus the strategy set can be represented by a 
triplet I={S, N, D}. We define the concept of individual acceptance degree  of a netizen as d(xi, xi-1) [-1, 1] 
for some attitude i, where the value -1 indicates that the netizen entirely rejects attitude i; the value 1 indicates 
full acceptance of attitude i; and the value 0 reflects the situation that the netizen is  neutral with respect to 
attitude i. Because the Internet behavior has the stronger herd mentality and effect of hint, the netizen would 
take the entire accept the attitude, d(xi, xi-1)=1, only if the opponent s attitude is consistent with himself. 
Otherwise, because of the difference between the others  and his/her own attitudes, the netizen tend to 
disbelieve his/her own former judgment under the external consensus pressure. Consequently the netizen may 
consider partial acceptance, which means -1 < d(xi, xi-1) < 1. Kahneman d iscussed Prospect Theory to explain 
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this phenomenon [10]. Because the replies on Internet are anonymous, netizens are taken as a monomorphic 
group. So the factor game of Internet emergency can be seen in Table 1, where 0 < a < 1, and 0 < b < 1. 
Table 1. Internet emergency 3×3 factor game with the monomorphic netizen group 
   Netizen  
  S N D 
 S (1 , 1) (a , 0) (-b, -a) 
Netizen N (0 , a) (0 , 0) (0 , b) 
 D (-a, -b) (b , 0) (1 , 1) 
 
The proportional distributions of netizens  decentralized behaviors at time t are defined as S(t), N(t), D(t). 
Obviously, the factor game has two pure Nash Equilibriums and one mixed  Nash Equilibrium S* = (sS*, sN*, sD*). 
We consider the random sampling strategy R in the pure strategy space I, R = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), where a netizen 
stochastically chooses the attitude of Support , Neutral  or Denial  with the probability 1/3. So  the utility of 
mixed strategy R is (R) = 2/9 > (sN). Therefore the attitude of Neutral  is the strict ly dominated strategy by 
the random sampling strategy R, N(t) 0, which means that the mixed strategy S*=(sS*, sN*, sD*) is an unstable 
Nash Equilibrium. We can get 
,   if   1 2S D Ss s t b a b   (1) 
2.2. Evolutionary equation concerning information supervision  
In any social economic system, the essence of behavior evolution is that (due to imitat ion and learn ing or 
resource redistribution or entry and exit) fitter strategies increase relative to less fit strategies in every 
population. Generally, the evolutionary dynamics can be divided into four types: the proportional, rank-order, 
signs, and positively dynamics correlated with relative payoff. The proportional dynamics is the most popular 
one in the literature  which is also named as  Replicator Dynamics. Each player is a representation of some 
special monomorphic bio logical population, which adopts a pure strategy si within a  period of time t. The 
proportional growth rate of this strategy d i(t)/dtis a strictly monotonically increasing function in  terms of the 
difference between its payoff (si) and the group average payoff. When Replicator Dynamics model is used to 
explain social and economic phenomena, there are obvious differences among various strategies  in the social 
learning obstacles. Taking the strategic observability into consideration, Sethi proposed a general replicator 
dynamic model as follows [11] 
i i
i i i i j j j j i jj B s j B s
d t dt t s s t s s t                        (2) 
where i is the social learning obstacle of the strategy i, and Bi(s) = {j I | j(s) > i(s)} is the strategy set that 
the utility is higher than the strategy i. 
For the public op inions in Internet emergency, several important factors will have effects on the st rategic 
observability, such as the background of the social event, the media reports, the informat ion supervision, etc. 
When the general replicator dynamic Eq. (2) is applied to the public opinions, we can obtain a specific 
expression based on the payoff matrix (see Table 1), which simplifies into the infectious diseases diffusion 
model as follow 
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,      1 2 ,   0S S S D S D S Sd t dt t t s s if t b a b d t dt                  (3) 
,      1 2 ,   0S D S D S D S Sd t dt t t s s if t b a b d t dt                  (4) 
where i is the Internet information supervision degree for the netizen s attitude i. Eq. (3) reflects the diffusing 
phase of Internet emergency, and Eq. (4) reflects the convergent phase. 
Conclusion 1. Considering the information supervision for public opinion in Internet emergency, the 
general replicator dynamic equation of public opinion simplifies into the infectious diseases diffusion model 
with the information supervision degree i for the netizen s strategy i. 
2.3. Finite individual players (changing population size) 
Most of the theoretical literatures assume that evolutionary game  models include infinite  individual players. 
Even if the actual population size could be growing or declin ing over time, it does not have any effect on the 
state space specification. This assumption is however questionable. The population size of netizens in Internet 
emergency is changing obviously at different evolutionary phases. Usually, it grows in the d iffusion phase, and 
then declines in the convergent phase. When analyzing the evolutionary mechanism of public opin ions in 
Internet emergency, we should take the changing netizens  population size into account since this could affect 
the distribution of state space. If the population size is large enough, the dynamic evolutionary course can be 
specified by ordinary differential equations or difference equations in a continuous state space. We can ignore 
the random fluctuations and differing perceptions of the current state in the evolutionary game model. 
Define the total number of netizens at t ime t as N(t ), and the number o f netizens with Support (S)  attitude 
as NS(t). Further define the proportion of S  as S(t) = NS(t)/N(t). Then the general replicator dynamics model 
described by Eqs. (3) and (4) of the public opinions can be written as the frequency distribution equations: 
1,    if , 0
2
S S S S DS S SN t N t N t s sdN t N t dN tb
dt N t N t a b dt
                        (5) 
1,  if , 0
2
D S S S DS S SN t N t N t s sdN t N t dN tb
dt N t N t a b dt
                         (6) 
Suppose the original number of netizens in the outbreak period t = 0 is N(0). When the Internet emergency is 
spreading, the number of netizens gradually  increases until it reaches the maximum N(tT)max at the turning point 
t = tT, where the netizens  utility of Support  strategy is equal to that of the Denial  strategy. After passing 
the event turning point tT, the number of netizens decreases, and the situation is slowly returning calm. We 
suppose that the changing number of netizens follows  the law of normal distribution about time t as follow 
2
2
10 0 exp
22
Tt tN t N N                                                                                             (7) 
The evolutionary course of public opin ion in Internet emergency is similar to the classical d iseases diffusion 
SIS/SIR model. A lthough some existing literatures have applied SIS/SIR model to discuss the rumor diffusing 
course in the special social network structure [12], they did not give the evolutionary mechanism of rumor 
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diffusion. In this paper, firstly, we build an  evolutionary game model to exp lain  the diffusing mechanis m of 
public opinion. Secondly, we take the frequency distribution function to reflect the evolutionary course of 
public opinion with changing population size. Because the evolution dynamics is not only dependent on the 
changing behavior of the player himself/herself, but also dependent on the changing behavior of the opponent 
and the changing external environment (for example, information supervision and payoff adjustment), it  is 
difficult to give the analytic solutions about Eqs. (3), (4), (5) and (6). In the Section 3, we take the numerical 
simulation with case analysis to discuss the effects of Internet information supervision and control measures for 
social affairs on the evolutionary course of public opinions. 
3. Numerical Experiments: The October 24, 2009 Self-sacrifice Event 
3.1. Internet  
The 10.24 self-sacrifice event  in  2009 reported by various media triggered wide response among the 
netizens. On one hand, the netizens highly praised the heroic deeds of self-sacrifice; on the other hand, the 
netizens unanimously condemned the outrageous  behavior of those fishing boat owners as breaking the lowest 
limits of social morality and bringing shame to everyone in the country. As the Internet public opinions 
continued to ferment, the Jingzhou City government started to investigate the truth of this serious event, and 
released an announcement that the nearby fishing boat owners participated in the rescue, but the salvage ships 
did nothing. The various netizens  comments in two periods can be shown in References [13] and [14]. 
For netizens with strong interests in the 10.24 self-sacrifice event , they would post comments on the 
related BBS or other Internet forums to express their own opin ions of support or denial. While, for other 
netizens with a neutral attitude, they might only take a hasty glimpse and moved on to other topics . Therefore 
any comments such as Intensely condemn the behavior , Advise cyber manhunt  can be taken as a Support  
attitude, and any comments  such as Understand the behavior of , Discontent with local 
government  and other replies including Mourn for victim students , Condemn the salvage ship  can be 
taken as a Denial  attitude that prevents the situation from spreading. The comments in the Internet forums 
were classified and further studied to reflect a netizen s indiv idual acceptance degree, which is a = 0.72 and b = 
0.28 on October 30, 2009 in the diffusing course. Similarly, we have a = 0.354 and b= 0.646 on November 7, 
2009 in the convergent course. 
When an Internet emergency continuously escalates, the influence of public opinions in Internet will spread 
to the real social life with enormous organizational mobilization and publicity effect. Now, it is urgent for the 
Internet management authorities to consider effective information supervision measures. On one hand, the real 
informat ion must be disclosed and strengthened. For example, clarifying the facts, publicizing the relative 
materials and evidences, building specialized websites, etc., can help to eliminate the learning obstacle, i 1. 
On the other hand, the false in formation and the demagogical comments in  the Internet forum need to be 
shielded or deleted, which would increase the strategy learning disabilities, i 0. 
We carry a numerical analysis of the general replicator dynamic Eq. (5) and (6) to study the information 
supervision by Internet management authorities. In the model, the influencing factors in the evolutionary 
equations include the informat ion supervision degree i, the initial proportional distribution i(t0), and the 
netizen s utility d ifference (si). The informat ion supervision degree i is an important control variab le 
determined by the Internet management authorities, which are set as S = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, and 0.9, respectively. 
Let the individual acceptance degrees be a = 0.72 and b = 0.28 in the Eq. (5) in the diffusing course, we can get 
the lower limit of orig inal p roportion S(t0) = 0.427. According to the diffusing Eq. (5), The left of Fig. 1 
displays the influences of information supervision on public opinions in the October 24 self-sacrifice event . 
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Conclusion 2. When Internet management authorities strengthen the information supervision of public 
opinions in the diffusing phase, for example, some extreme or fictitious forum posts are shielded or deleted, 
S 0, the diffusing speed of Internet emergency becomes slower, obviously. 
3.2. Extended model considering Internet supervision and control measure  
When an Internet emergency breaks out, relevant government department need to  implement contingency 
plans promptly in order to win the support of public opinions, for example, to start an immediate investigation 
of the social hot issues, publicize the news in time, adjust the payoffs, etc. Once the above control measures 
reach the crit ical condition Eq. (5), the evolutionary course of Internet emergency should enter into the 
convergent phase expressed by Eq. (6). 
According to netizens  comments in Reference 13 and 14, let the individual acceptance degrees be a = 0.354 
and b = 0.646 in the convergent course in Eq. (5), we can get the crit ical proportion S(tT) = 0.548 in the turning 
point. Substitute this into the convergent Eq. (6), we can get the crit ical time tT = 27.07. In our analysis, we only 
choose informat ion supervision degree S = 0.3 as an example to discuss the influence of controlling measures 
on the evolutionary course (see (b) in Figure2). In the early phase, S(tT) < 0.548, the evolutionary mechanism 
of October 24 self-sacrifice event  follows the diffusing curve described by Eq. (5). In the later convergent 
phase, S(tT) > 0.548, the government authorities take control measures to promote the evolution of events 
across the turning point effectively and finally enter the convergent course. Obviously, with the information 
being disclosed and strengthened in the convergent phase, D 1, for example, clarify ing the facts, publicizing 
the relative materials and evidences, building specialized websites, etc., Internet emergency is returning calm 
more rapidly. In the lower right corner of (b) in Figure 1, the convergent speed becomes faster with larger D. 
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Fig. 1. (a) E S on diffusing course   (b) Effects of control measure and information disclosure 
Conclusion 3. If controlling measures taken by relevant government departments for social hot event reach 
the critical condition (5), the evolutionary course of public opinion in Internet emergency should enter into the 
convergent phase. In particular, information disclosure in the latter phase can help calm the situation.  
Conclusion 2 and 3 show that the informat ion supervision taken by Internet management department may 
have an important influence on the evolutionary speed of public opinions, but it cannot change the evolutionary 
tendency. If the relevant government depart ment takes the contingency plans and effective measures to control 
social events, the evolutionary tendency of public opinion can be transformed fundamentally. Moreover, the 
sooner government do it, the better it will be. It is noticeable that the above conclusions are based on the 
hypothesis of fixed population size. If we relax the assumptions, i.e., the changing population size, will the 
above conclusions still hold? We should discuss this problem through numerical simulation in the following. 
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3.3. Extended model with changing population size 
There have been 4152 websites  publishing the news Hubei college students save drowning, nearby fishing 
boats do nothing about them  until October 30, 2009 [13]. Correspondingly, there have been only 1402 
websites publishing the news Jingzhou City, Hubei Province investigate and restore the students save 
drowning scene  until November 7, 2009 [14]. So the number of netizens can be set as N(0) = 1402, and 
N(tT)max = 4152. Insert them into Eq. (7), the  of Normal Distribution can be calculated as follow 
max1 2 1 0.2035
0
N t
N
                                                                                                            (8) 
In Eq. (5) and (6), the lower limit o f the number of original netizens holding Support  attitude is NS(0) = 
N(0) S(t0) = 1402×0.427 = 598, and the maximal number o f netizens holding Support  attitude is NS(tT) = 
N(t) S(tT) = 1402×0.549 = 769 in the turning point. According to the evolutionary Eq. (5) and (6) which 
intersect each other at the critical point NS(tT) = 769, we can get the practical value of informat ion supervision 
degree S = 0.000065, and the critical time tT = 26.96, which is the mean value of the Normal Distribution in  Eq. 
(7). So we get the frequency distribution of the number of netizens holding Support  attitude under the fixed 
population size N = 1402 (the left panel in  Figure 2), and the changing population size that fo llows Normal 
Distribution Eq. (7), which is represented by the dotted line (the right panel in Figure 2). 
Conclusion 4. Considering a changing netizen population size with  normal distribution, the delay effect  
happens both in the diffusing and convergent courses. Specifically, the population size increases (decreases) at 
a slightly slower speed in the diffusing (convergent) phase. But the delay effect is very small. 
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Fig. 2.  
4. Conclusions 
Internet information supervision is a controversial topic in the world. This paper studies the evolutionary 
mechanis m and informat ion supervision of public opinions in Internet emergency, and the following 
conclusions can be drawn: 
 When Internet manager strengthen the information supervision of public opinions, e.t., shield ing some 
exaggerated or fictitious forum postings, the diffusing speed of Internet emergency becomes slow. 
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 If the control measures taken by relevant government departments for social hot events reach the critical 
condition, the evolutionary course of public opinion in Internet emergency should enter into the convergent 
phase. In particular, information disclosure in the latter phase can help calm the situation. 
 Considering the changing netizen population size, the small delay effect  happens both in the diffusing 
phase and convergent phase because of the smaller peak point at the lower turn point. 
Recently, the Internet emergency and Internet violence frequently appear in the  virtual world. China is in the 
Jungle Era  of social media, which (or Internet marketer) [15]. The paper does 
not distinguish real netizens from the water army . Moreover, the parameters used in the paper are main ly 
derived from the case of October 24 self-sacrifice event y to compile an  Internet emergency 
database consisting of more cases . The conclusions reported in this paper are just based on preliminary works. 
Further studies are required to improve theoretical model and numeral simulations. 
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